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Abstract
In economies subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, competitive equilibrium allocations
are constrained inefficient: reallocations of assets support Pareto superior allocations. This is
the case even if the asset market for the allocation of aggregate risks is complete.
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Idiosyncratic risk does not affect the allocation of resources at Pareto optimal allocations.1
Competitive equilibrium allocations inherit this property if the asset market for the insurance
of idiosyncratic risk is complete. But, if realizations of idiosyncratic shocks are publicly unob-
servable or unverifiable, idiosyncratic risk may well not be insurable; indeed, this is a standard
assumption in macroeconomics.2
In abstract, two-period economies where financial markets are incomplete, competitive equi-
librium allocations are constrained inefficient, generically in the spaces of economies, as demon-
strated by [10].3 This result, however, does not imply that constrained inefficiency holds for
economies with idiosyncratic risk, as the particular structure of these economies is non-generic:
the economies considered in the literature on incomplete financial markets allow for individual
perturbations of preferences and endowments; but if one is to distinguish between idiosyncratic
and aggregate risk, one must impose that some individuals, given an aggregate shock, face
exactly the same idiosyncratic shocks and have the same preferences.
Thus, there is a gap between the type of model usually considered in macroeconomics
and the generic results obtained in the literature on incomplete financial markets. The goal
of this paper is to illustrate how these two strands of literature can be brought together.
We do this in two ways. On one hand, we show that in the set of two-period economies
with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, competitive equilibrium allocations are, indeed, generically
constrained suboptimal: reallocations of assets support Pareto superior allocations. In other
words, we extend the generic results from the incomplete markets literature to the type of
risk that is of most interest in macroeconomics: in most economies where idiosyncratic risk is
uninsurable, a reallocation of the financial assets that permit insurance against aggregate risk
can be used to make all types of individuals in the economy ex-ante better off. Importantly,
this result does not depend on the assumption that there exists some aggregate shock against
which the individuals cannot insure.4
On the other hand, we use a series of examples to emphasize the mechanism by which a
reallocation of assets brings about a Pareto improvement: the ability of the policy to perturb
future relative prices. This mechanism, which lies at the core of our general argument, is
made explicit in an example for an exchange economy with ex-ante heterogeneous consumers,
but also in two-period production economies with ex-ante homogeneous individuals. In this
latter case, we show that the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk leads to inefficiently
high levels of savings at equilibrium, under standard assumptions. Importantly, the same
mechanism we show operates in an economy of overlapping generations with individuals who
are homogenous when young but face uninsurable, idiosyncratic labor shocks when old. Of
course, in this type of economy equilibrium allocations are subject to the standard problem of
1 See [3], [16] and [17].
2 See [14] and [13].
3 Also, [6] and [7].
4 In fact, for the sake of simplicity, we prove our results for the case in which there is only idiosyncratic
risk. But it is important to note that the result also holds in the presence of aggregate risk, and that the
mathematical argument would be, as a matter of fact, simpler in that case, although it would require a more
complicated notation. Also, the result holds whether the asset market for the allocation of aggregate risk is
complete or not.
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dynamic inefficiency, even under certainty.5 What our example shows is how, in the presence
of idiosyncratic risk, the ability to perturb relative prices through perturbations to savings
decisions must be compounded with standard recommendation derived from the problem of
dynamic inefficiency. Importantly, in an economy in which the equilibrium interest rate is below
the rate of population growth, a policy that forces individuals to invest more (the standard
Golden Rule recommendation) may leave all generations worse off in lifetime utility.
This paper is related to the work of [8], where an infinite-horizon, one-sector neoclassical
economy is considered, under the assumption that idiosyncratic income and wealth shocks are
uninsurable. There, in a calibration to US data, it is shown that at competitive equilibrium the
economy underinvests in steady state.6 It is also related to [11], where a two-period economy
with idiosyncratic risk is used to study the welfare effects of taxation of labor and capital
income, which occur through its impact on capital accumulation.
The demonstration that competitive equilibria in economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic
shocks are constrained suboptimal makes an important methodological point relevant for eco-
nomic policy. Intervention is often said to be counterproductive because competitive equilibrium
cannot be Pareto improved; our theorem shows that such a view is untenable.7
The paper is organized as follows: The first section presents two examples that illustrate the
mechanism by which the general result of constrained suboptimality holds. The first of these
examples is for an economy exactly like the one for which we will prove general results, while
the second example extends the analysis for the case of a storage economy. The following
two sections introduce the general kind of economies in which our analysis holds, and define
competitive equilibrium and Pareto efficiency for this kind of economies. Section 4 introduces
the definition of constrained inefficiency for economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, and
states the main theorem, whose proof requires a construction and argument that are given in
Section 5. Then, Section 6 presents two more examples of constrained suboptimality; the first
extends the analysis to an economy with a production technology more general than storage,
while the second example considers an economy of overlapping generations, and briefly assesses
the extent to which the classical Golden Rule applies in the presence of idiosyncratic risk. A
technical appendix completes the paper.
1 Some examples
Two simple examples that illustrate the main result of the paper: in the absence of insurance
opportunities for idiosyncratic risk, competitive markets typically induce constrained subop-
timal allocations of commodities. The first example considers a simplified economy with two
5 See [9].
6 For other values of the parameterization, they show that at equilibrium the economy will overinvest. For
related work, see [2], who studies the effects of asset market incompleteness on the equilibrium levels of interest
rates and capital stock.
7 The identification of Pareto improving asset reallocations from market data remains an issue: because of
the particular aggregation structure of idiosyncratic shocks, neither the positive identification results of [15] and
[4], nor the negative results of [5] apply.
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types of individuals, one of whom faces uninsurable idiosyncratic risk; the example is simple
enough to allow for the computation of a closed-form solution that illustrates the mechanism
by which a Pareto improvement may be induced after an asset reallocation policy. The second
example illustrates how this result can be extended to the case where a storage technology is
available; this example is presented for general preferences first, but a specific functional form
is used, again, for the purpose of obtaining an explicit solution. Storage allows constrained sub-
optimality to prevail even in the absence of (ex ante) heterogeneity among individuals. Storage
or, more generally, production are not encompassed by the abstract model that follows. But,
importantly, the logic that underlies constrained suboptimality remains unchanged and the
examples can be understood as leads for further work.
1.1 A heterogeneous exchange economy
One commodity is exchanged and consumed in the first period, date 0, while two commodities
are exchanged and consumed at date 1, the second period. Quantities of the date-zero com-
modity are x; for simplicity, the two commodities of date 1 are l = a, b and their quantities xa
and xb.
There are two types of individuals, i = α, β, and each type consists of a continuum of
individuals of unit mass. The intertemporal utility function of an individual of type β is
uβ(x, xa, xb) = x+ (1− γ) lnxa + γ lnxb,
where, 0 < γ < 1, and his endowment at date 1 consists of b units of commodity b.8 The
intertemporal utility function of an individual of type α is
uα(x, xa, xb) = x+ γ lnxa + (1− γ) lnxb,
and his endowment at date 1 consists only of commodity a; but, importantly, it is subject to
idiosyncratic shocks: it is a± ε, with equal probability.9
Importantly, at date 0 individuals can trade only in the consumption good and a risk-free
bond that matures at date 1. The consumption good be nume`raire in the first period, and q is
the price of the bond. At date 1, individuals only trade on the two commodities; commodity a
is nume`raire, and the price of commodity b is p.
By direct computation, if holdings of the bond are y for individuals of type α and −y for
individuals of type β, the equilibrium price at date 1 is
p(y) =
(1− γ)a+ (1− 2γ)y
(1− γ)b , (1)
which depends non-trivially on asset holdings as long as γ 6= 1/2, a condition that we now
impose. At date 1, then, the marginal utility of revenue for individuals of type β is
λβ =
1
pb− y ,
8 With quasi-linear preferences, it is not necessary to specify the endowments of individuals at date 0.
9 At date 1, equal proportions of individuals of type α have endowments a+ε and a−ε, and, as a consequence,
the aggregate endowment of commodity a is guaranteed to be a, without any risk.
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while for individuals of type α it varies with the realization of the idiosyncratic shock – the
personal state of an individual – and is
λα(ε) =
1
a+ ε+ y
or
λα(−ε) = 1
a− ε+ y ,
with equal probability. The optimization of individuals of type β at date 0 requires, therefore,
that
q =
1
pb− y =
(1− γ)
(1− γ)a− γy ,
while optimization of individuals of type α requires that
q = (
1
2
)
1
a+ ε+ y
+ (
1
2
)
1
a− ε+ y =
a+ y
(a+ y)2 − ε2 .
As a consequence, at equilibrium,
y =
−a+√a2 + 4ε2(1− γ)
2
. (2)
A policy intervention perturbs assets holdings and makes revenue transfers at date 0: policy
is a pair (dx, dy) of transfers of revenue and bonds to individuals of type α. The welfare effects
of a policy are
duα = dx+ qdy − 1
2
(λα(ε)xαb (ε) + λ
α(−ε)xαb (−ε))p′dy,
and
duβ = −dx− qdy − λβ(xβb − b)p′dy.
Pareto improving interventions exist if the matrix(
1 q − 1
2
(λα(ε)xαb (ε) + λ
α(−ε)xαb (−ε))p′
−1 −q − λβ(xβb − b)p′
)
(3)
is nonsingular, which is the case for any ε 6= 0.10
In order to find the type of policy that induces a Pareto improvement, we write
dy =
duα + duβ
(Λα + Λβ)p′
,
10 Singularity of the matrix would occur if, and only if,
1
2
λα(ε)xαb (ε) +
1
2
λα(−ε)xαb (−ε) = −λβ(xβb − b),
which is equivalent to
1− γ
p
= − 1
pb− y
(
γ(pb− y)
p
− b
)
,
and, hence, to y = 0, which occurs only in the absence of idiosyncratic shocks, with ε = 0.
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where
Λα = −1
2
(λα(ε)xαb (ε) + λ
α(−ε)xαb (−ε))
and
Λβ = −λβ(xβb − b).
By direct computation, Λα + Λβ > 0 if, and only if,
1
p
<
b
pb− y , (4)
which is the case since y > 0. It follows, then, that the sign of a Pareto improving dy is the
same as the sign of p′, namely positive if γ < 1/2, and negative if γ > 1/2.
1.2 A storage economy
The setting is again of two-periods, but, now, there is only a continuum of ex-ante identical
individuals. One commodity is available for exchange and consumption in date 0, and, impor-
tantly, it is storable. At date 1 there are two commodities: individuals trade and consume what
they have stored of the first commodity, along with any further endowment they may have, and
they also exchange and consume a second commodity.
The amount of commodity that is stored by each individual at date 0 is k, and e2 is the
endowment of commodity 2 they all receive at date 1. But assume the endowment of commodity
1 is subject to idiosyncratic risk: for an individual in personal state s, the endowment of
commodity 1 is e1,s. The proportion of individuals in state s is pii,s and, for simplicity of
notation, e1 = E[e1,s].
11
With Bernoulli utility indices vs, the individual’s von Neumann-Morgen- stern ex-ante utility
is
u(k, x) = −k + E[vs(xs)],
where xs = (x1,s, x2,s) denotes the individuals’ consumption at date 1 in state s. If commodity
1 is nume`raire at date 1, so that prices can be denoted by (1, p), then the nominal wealth of an
individual in personal state s is e1,s+k+pe2. If the marginal utility of income in personal state
s is λs, then the first-order condition for optimization at date 0 is that E[λs] = 1, and, as a
consequence, the ex-ante utility impact of an infinitesimal perturbation to the level of savings,
dk, around its competitive equilibrium level, is
du = −dk + E[λs((−x2,s + e2)dp+ dk)] = E[λs(−x2,s + e2)]dp. (5)
Under certainty, market-clearing implies that E[λs(−x2,s + e2)] = 0, so it is impossible to
improve ex-ante utility by the implementation of levels of savings different from the ones chosen
under competitive equilibrium. But, if date 1 spot prices depend on the effective endowment of
commodity 1, then the equilibrium utility level can be improved upon if E[λs(−x2,s + e2)] 6= 0.
11 Throughout the paper, the probability measure with respect to which the expectation is taken is left
implicit; that is E[e1,s] = Epi[e1,s].
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As in the previous example, a simple structure allows for a closed-form solution. First, the
Bernoulli indices are state-independent and are defined by
v(xs) = ln x1,s + lnx2,s.
By direct computation, given savings of k, equilibrium prices are
p = (e1 + k)/e2, (6)
an expression that depends positively on k. Also, then, λs = 2/(e1,s + e1 + 2k) and
e2 − x2,s = e2
2
(
e1 − e1,s
e1 + k
),
so that, if, further there are only two personal states, e1,s = e1± ε, and these states occur with
equal probability, then
E[λs(e2 − x2,s)] = 1
e1 + k
(
ε2
4(e1 + k)2 − ε2 ).
Now, at the equilibrium level of savings, it must be true that E[λs] = 1. By direct compu-
tation, this implies that
E[λs(es − x2,s)] = ε
2
4(e1 + k)2
> 0, (7)
which means that in this economy individuals underinvest at competitive equilibrium.
1.3 The mechanism
Note the two features that are necessary for the existence of Pareto improving policies in the
first example, by the looking at Eq. (3). First, it requires that the relative price depend
nontrivially on the date-1 wealth of the individuals, namely that p′ 6= 0. Second, it requires
that (
1
2
(λα(ε)xαb (ε) +
1
2
λα(−ε)xαb (−ε))
)
+ λβ(xβb − b) 6= 0,
for otherwise the matrix is singular. In words, effectiveness of the policy requires that the
aggregate, across individual states and types of individuals, of individual commodity trades
weighted by the product of the marginal utility of income and the probability of the individual
states does not vanish.
Since we can compute a closed-form solution for that economy, we can directly observe that
these two requirements are satisfied generically in the space of economies: (i) from Eq. (1),
one has that the first condition hods generically on preferences (as long as γ 6= 1/2); and (ii) it
follows from Eq. (2) and Eq. (4) that the second condition holds generically on endowments
(as long as ε 6= 0).
This example corresponds precisely to the general result that is presented below. The second
example illustrates how this result can be extended to an ex-ante homogeneous economy with
storage, through the possibility of a Pareto improving perturbation to the equilibrium levels
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of saving in the economy. In the argument of this example, note from Eq. (5) that the
possibility that du 6= 0 requires precisely the two features described above: that dp 6= 0 and
that E[λs(−x2,s + e2)] 6= 0.12
2 The economy
The economy evolves over two dates, 0 and 1. Individuals are of different types, i = 1, . . . , I,
and within each type there is a continuum of individuals of mass 1. Individuals of a given type
are ex-ante identical, but can face different idiosyncratic shocks at date 1: each individual may
find herself in any one of a set of different personal states, s = 1, . . . , S. The distribution of
individuals of type i across personal states is pii = (pii1, . . . , pi
i
S) 0: in date 1, a fraction piis of
individuals of type i shall find themselves in personal state s.
There is a finite number of commodities in the economy, l = 1, . . . , L, and individuals
consume these commodities in both dates. At date 0, the endowment of an individual depends
on her type, and the bundle of commodities is ei0. At date 1, individual endowments depend
on the type and are subject to idiosyncratic risk: in personal state s, an individual of type i is
endowed with a bundle eis. Thus, e
i = (ei0, . . . , e
i
s) denotes the endowment of an individual;
13 it
strictly positive at date 0 and in all personal states at date 1.
While the date 1 endowment of an individual depends on her type and on the idiosyncratic
shock, at the macroeconomic level there is no risk:14 the aggregate endowment of the economy
is
∑
i
∑S
s=1 pi
i
se
i
s.
An individual’s consumption plan is x = (x0, . . . , xS), where each xs is a bundle of commodi-
ties. The preferences of an individual over consumption plans are represented by the utility
function15
ui(x) = ui0(x0) +
S∑
s=1
piisu
i
1(xs),
where the temporal, cardinal utility indices, ui0 and u
i
1, belong to the class of strictly monotonic,
strongly concave, C3 functions v : RL++ → R, that satisfy the following interiority condition: if
a sequence (xn)
∞
n=1 of strictly positive consumption bundles converges to a boundary bundle,
then ||Dv(xn)||−1Dv (xn) ·xn → 0 and ||Dv(xn)||−1 →∞. We denote this class of functions by
U , and endow it with the topology of C3, uniform convergence on compacta.16
12 When we use specific functional forms to obtain an explicit solution, it is clear from Eq. (6) that relative
prices depend on the level of savings, and from Eq. (7) that the weighted aggregate of trades does not vanish,
generically (as long as ε 6= 0).
13 For simplicity of notation, state s = 0 refers to date 0, whenever there is no possibility of confusion.
14 All the results in the paper are true in the presence of aggregate risk, even if this risk is fully insurable,
as long as idiosyncratic risk remains uninsurable. With aggregate risk, the presentation of the problem and the
results is more cumbersome, but the proofs of the theorems are, in fact, simpler.
15 Again, the arguments would be simpler without additively separability, and if the date-1 Bernoulli indices
are state-dependent. On the other hand, the result of the paper continue to hold if the Bernoulli indices of each
type of individuals are the same in the two periods, but in this case the proof becomes slightly more complicated.
16 See [1, §3.17].
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An economy is completely described by the profile of endowments and preferences, (e, u) =
((e1, u1), . . . , (eI , uI)).17 The space of economies is endowed with the product topology.
The economy is sufficiently heterogeneous: (i) individuals are ex-ante heterogeneous, I ≥ 2;
(ii) idiosyncratic risk exists, as S ≥ 2; and (iii) the set of commodities is diverse, L ≥ 2.
3 Competitive equilibrium and Pareto efficiency
Allocations of commodities treat all individuals of the same type symmetrically. Thus, an
allocation for economy (e, u) is a profile x = (x1, . . . , xI) that specifies a consumption plan
for each type; the allocation is feasible if
∑
i x
i
0 =
∑
i e
i
0 and
∑
i
∑S
s=1 pi
i
sx
i
s =
∑
i
∑S
s=1 pi
i
se
i
s.
The definition of a Pareto efficient allocation is the usual one, restricted to the class of type-
symmetric allocations. 18
In order to consider the effects of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, only a riskless asset can be
traded: there is only one financial asset in the economy; it pays one unit of commodity 1 at
date 1. There is no trade in other assets, in particular in assets that insure against idiosyncratic
risk. Holdings of the asset are y, while its price is q.
Besides assets, individuals trade commodities in spot markets. Prices of commodities are
p0 = (1, . . . , p0,l, . . .) at date 0, and p1 = (1, . . . , p1,l, . . .) at date 1;
19 across dates, prices of
commodities are p = (p0, p1). Commodity 1 is the nume`raire of the economy at each spot, and
its price is 1. All other prices are strictly positive, and P is the set of normalized spot prices,
so that, across date events, p ∈ P2.
At prices p and q, an individual chooses a consumption plan that maximizes her ex-ante
utility, and holdings of the asset that make her consumption plan financially feasible. That
is, an individual of type i will choose a plan x and holdings y subject to the constraints that:
(i) at date zero, she must be able to afford her portfolio along with current consumption:
p0(e
i
0 − x0) = qy; and (ii) in each personal state at date 1, the return of the portfolio, which
is simply her asset holdings, must cover the value of her planned consumption, beyond her
endowments: p1(xs − eis) = y, for each personal state s.20
17 The distributions of individuals of a given type across personal states are fixed, and it is not necessary to
include these parameters in the definition of an economy.
18 The usual intuition that at Pareto efficient allocations individual utility functions must have collinear
gradients carries over to the present context, but applies in a strong sense: at efficient allocations idiosyncratic
risk is fully shared, so (i) for a given type, consumption must be invariant across personal states; and (ii) across
types, gradients must be collinear, even for different personal states, given an aggregate state. Formally it
suffices to observe that if allocation x is Pareto efficient, then there are strictly positive numbers γi, one for
each type, such that γiDui0(x
i
0) = γ
i′Dui
′
0 (x
i′
0 ) and γ
iDui1(x
i
s) = γ
i′Dui
′
1 (x
i′
s′), for all pairs of types, i and i
′,
and all pairs of personal states, s and s′.
19 For simplicity of notation, price vectors and gradients of utility functions are taken as row vectors, whereas
quantities are taken as column vectors.
20 The unique optimizer for individuals of type i, (xi, yi) is characterized by the following first-order conditions:
for a vector λi = (λi0, . . . , λ
i
S) 0,
(i) Dui0(x
i
0) = λ
i
0p0, and pi
i
sDu
i
1(x
i
s) = λ
i
sp1 for all s = 1, . . . , S;
(ii) λi0q =
∑S
s=1 λ
i
s; and
(iii) p0(ei0 − xi0) = qyi, and p1(xis − eis) = yi at all s = 1, . . . , S.
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The (S + 1)× L(S + 1) matrix
Ψ(p) :=

p0 0 . . . 0
0 p1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . p1

and the (S + 1) × 1 vector R(q) := (−q, 1, . . . , 1)T simplify the statement of the optimization
problem of an individual. It is simply
max
x,y
ui(x) : Ψ(p)(x− ei) = R(q)y,
and the first-order necessary and sufficient conditions are that for some strictly positive vector
λi = (λi0, . . . , λ
i
S), we have that Du
i(xi) = λiΨ(p) and λiR(q) = 0, while Ψ(p)(xi−ei) = R(q)yi.
For an economy (e, u), a competitive equilibrium consists of an allocation of commodities,
one of asset holdings, a vector commodity prices and a price for the riskless asset, such that all
the types of individuals optimize and all markets clear. For a more operational characterization
of equilibria, it is convenient for us to make the vectors of individual marginal utilities of income
part of the definition of equilibrium, and to let the first-order conditions of the optimization
problems account for individual rationality. Formally, if21
F(x, λ, y, p, q, e, u) :=

...
(Dui(xi)− λiΨ(p))T
R(q)yi −Ψ(p)(xi − ei)
(λiR(q))T
...∑
i(e˜
i
0 − x˜i0)∑
i,s pi
i
s(e˜
i
s − x˜is)∑
i y
i

,
where, here and henceforth, e˜ and x˜ exclude the nume`raire commodity at all states, an equi-
librium for the economy (e, u) is a 5-tuple (x, λ, y, p, q) such that F(x, λ, y, p, q, e) = 0.
A competitive equilibrium exists for any economy. Importantly, given any profile of prefer-
ences, there are only finitely many competitive equilibria, generically in endowments.
Theorem 1 For any profile of preferences, the set of profiles of endowments for which the
economy has finitely many equilibria is open and has full Lebesgue measure.
21 The domain of F is
RI(S+1)L++ × RI(S+1)++ × RI × P2 × R× RI(S+1)L++ × U2I ;
it maps into
(R(S+1)L++ × RS+1++ × R)I × R2(L−1)++ × R.
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Proof: This argument is well known. The result follows from the fact that, given u, F(·, u) is
transverse to 0, and from the Transversality Theorem (See, for example, [12] or [18]. 2
A subset of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space is strongly generic if it is open and has full
Lebesgue measure (its complement has null measure), and a subset of an abstract metric space
is generic if it is open and dense.
It follows that the model under consideration preserves the standard positive properties of
the GEI model with nume`raire assets: equilibrium always exists, and there are only finitely
many equilibria in a strongly generic set of endowments, for any given profile of preferences.
Since idiosyncratic shocks are nontrivial (and uninsurable), it is reasonable to expect that
competitive equilibria be inefficient. Indeed, also generically, the inefficiency of competitive
equilibrium holds in a strong sense: since idiosyncratic risk is nontrivial, generically in endow-
ments equilibrium consumption depends on all idiosyncratic shocks, for all types of individuals,
and is therefore Pareto inefficient.
Theorem 2 For any profile of preferences, there exists a strongly generic subset of profiles
of endowments for which at every competitive equilibrium allocation, x, one has that λis/pi
i
s 6=
λis′/pi
i
s′ and x
i
s 6= xis′, for all types i and all personal states s, s′ = 1, . . . , S, s 6= s′.
Proof: For each type i, and each pair of date-1 personal states, s 6= s′, the mapping
(x, y, λ, p, q, e) 7→
( F(p, q, x, y, λ, e, u)
λis
piis
− λis′
pii
s′
)
,
by direct computation, is transverse to 0; thus, on a strongly generic set of endowments, the
mapping is transverse to 0 as a function of (x, y, λ, p, q) only. Since (x, y, λ, p, q) contains one
fewer argument than the mapping has components, this implies implies that λis/pi
i
s 6= λis′/piis′
whenever F(x, y, λ, p, q, e, u) = 0. By the first-order conditions of individual optimization, it
follows that xis 6= xis′ at every equilibrium allocation for endowments in this strongly generic
set. The intersection the sets constructed in this way for all (i, s, s′) is strongly generic. 2
4 Constrained inefficiency
The fact that an allocation is Pareto inefficient says that a reallocation of consumption plans
that is feasible from the point of view of the aggregate resources available to the society can
improve ex-ante wellbeing for all types. This does not imply, however, that one such reallocation
exists which can be implemented through the existing financial instruments.
An allocation x is constrained-inefficient if there exist commodity prices pˆ, a commodity
allocation xˆ, date-zero revenue transfers (τˆ 1, . . . , τˆ I) and an asset allocation (yˆi, . . . , yˆI) such
that
1. revenue transfers are balanced:
∑
i τˆ
i = 0;
2. the asset allocation is feasible:
∑
i yˆ
i = 0;
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3. individual consumptions are optimal (given prices and wealth): for every i, xˆi0 solves the
problem
max
x′
ui0(x
′) : pˆ0x′ ≤ pˆ0ei0 + τˆ i,
and each xˆis solves
max
x′
ui1(x
′) : pˆ1x′ ≤ pˆ1eis + yˆi;
4. all markets clear:
∑
i(e
i
0 − xˆi0) = 0 and
∑
i
∑S
s=1 pi
i
s(e
i
s − xˆis) = 0; and
5. every individual is ex-ante better off at xˆ: for every i, ui(xˆi) > ui(xi).
This is, an allocation is constrained inefficient if a reallocation of wealth, via revenue at date
zero and the riskless asset at date one, and competitive trade in the commodity markets can
make all types of individual ex-ante better off (condition 5). Conditions 1 and 2 imply that the
reallocation is balanced, condition 3 implies that all individuals are rational in the commodity
markets, which clear by condition 4.
The main result of this paper is that, typically, equilibrium allocations are constrained
inefficient. The theorem has the important implication that just by trading the risk-free asset
differently, all types of individuals in the society could be made ex-ante strictly better off.
Theorem 3 There exists a generic subset of economies, D, where every equilibrium allocation
is constrained inefficient: for every (e, u) ∈ D, if (x, λ, y, p, q) is an equilibrium for (e, u), then
x is constrained inefficient.
The proof of the theorem exploits the idea of [10]: by perturbing the Hessians of the utility
functions, in a local, finite-dimensional subspace of economies, we can change the shape of the
demand functions, without changing their level at given prices and endowments (which is makes
the set of equilibria invariant in the subspace). These perturbations are used to imply that,
generically, relative prices can induce income reallocations beyond the span of the existing asset.
For the argument to hold, sufficiently many relative prices (hence commodities) are needed.
The argument, which invokes the Transversality Theorem once more, is applied on the finite-
dimensional subspace, locally, to obtain constrained inefficiency in a strongly generic subset of
that subspace; for the global space of economies, the latter local result implies denseness and
hence genericity.
We apply this idea using the technique developed by [6],22 which allows us to relax a re-
quirement that [10] imposed on the number of commodities: indeed, as in [6], we only require
the existence of two commodities.
5 Genericity of constrained inefficiency
A series of properties hold generically at equilibrium and are useful in the proof of Theorem 3.
With these properties, for any economy in a generic set, there is associated a lower-dimensional
22 See, also, [20].
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neighborhood of economies. In order to prove that the set of economies where all equilibrium
allocations are constrained inefficient is dense, it suffices to show that, for any economy in the
generic set, there is an economy in the lower-dimensional neighborhood, arbitrarily close to it,
where the property holds.
5.1 A characterization of constrained suboptimality
The function defined by
H(x, λ, p, y, τ, e, u) :=

...
ui(xi)
...
(Dui(x)− λΨ(p))T
Ψ(p)(xi − ei)− (τ i, 1, . . . , 1)T
...∑
i(e˜
i
0 − x˜i0)∑
i
∑S
s=1 pi
i
s(e˜
i
s − x˜is)∑
i τ
i∑
i y
i

.
plays a role similar to F , in the sense that it will make the definition of constrained ineffi-
ciency operational, but three differences deserve mention. First, the price of the asset is not an
argument, and the block of components that includes the first-order conditions of consumers
does not include no-arbitrage conditions for assets: in the alternative plan that makes an allo-
cation constrained inefficient, asset holdings are not being traded or determined by individual
optimization. Second, the first I components of H are the types’ utility levels, which did not
appear in F ; these components will be used to determine the welfare effects of asset realloca-
tions. Finally, the previous-to-last component of H captures whether date-0 revenue transfers
are balanced.
Lemma 1 If (x, λ, y, p, q) is an equilibrium for economy (e, u) and the matrix
Dx,λ,p,y,τH(x, λ, p, y, (−qyi)Ii=1, e, u)
has full (row) rank, then allocation x is constrained inefficient.
The proofs of this and all other lemmas are in an appendix.
5.2 Finite-dimensional subspaces of economies
All results so far have been independent of the assumption that the economy is commodities
are heterogeneous, which implies that there exist relative prices at date 1. The assumption is,
nevertheless, important for what follows.
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Lemma 2 For any profile of preferences, on a strongly generic subset of endowments,∑
i
S∑
s=1
λis
λi0
(e˜is − x˜is) 6= 0
at every competitive equilibrium.
Another auxiliary function is obtained by looking only at the lower block of components of
the function H, namely the conditions that define competitive equilibrium in commodity trades
only, for a given, feasible, allocation of date-0 revenue and holdings of the riskless asset; it is
defined by
G(x, λ, p, y, τ, e, u) :=

...
(Dui(x)− λΨ(p))T
Ψ(p)(xi − ei)− (τ i, 1, . . . , 1)T
...∑
i(e˜
i
0 − x˜i0)∑
i,s pi
i
s(e˜
i
s − x˜is)∑
i τ
i∑
i y
i

.
The set of economies defined in the following lemma will be the basis of the local analysis later.
Lemma 3 There exists a generic subset of economies, Dr, where there is only a finite number
of equilibria and, at every equilibrium,
1. the matrix Dx,λ,y,p,qF(x, λ, y, p, q, e, u) has full rank;
2. for every i, s and s′, s 6= s′, λis/piis 6= λis′/piis′ and xis 6= xis′;
3.
∑
i
∑S
s=1
λis
λi0
(e˜is − x˜is) 6= 0; and
4. the matrix Dx,λ,p,y,τG(x, λ, p, y,−(qyi)Ii=1, e, u) has full rank.
5.3 Finite-dimensional subspaces of economies
For any given economy that satisfies the properties of Lemma 3, there is a neighborhood of
economies where the set of equilibria is the same. These economies have the same endowments,
but different preferences; the change in preferences is only in their second derivatives at equi-
librium consumptions, which implies the invariance of equilibria. The construction first fixes
a set of commodity bundles at which it perturbs the utility functions; then, it introduces the
perturbations.
The construction is local, so we start by fixing an economy (e¯, u¯) in the set Dr defined in
Lemma 3. Let E denote the set of competitive equilibria of this economy, and notice that, since
this set is finite, we can isolate its points in open balls of sufficiently small radius: in particular,
let ¯ > 0 be such that the open balls of radius 2¯ around each equilibrium contain no other
equilibria.23
23 That is, that for every equilibrium (x¯, λ¯, y¯, p¯, q¯) ∈ E , one has that B2¯(x¯, λ¯, y¯, p¯, q¯) ∩ E = {(x¯, λ¯, y¯, p¯, q¯)}.
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5.3.1 Step 1: Bundles where preferences are perturbed
Perturbations of the utility functions are restricted to neighborhoods of particular consumption
levels. For the construction of the perturbations, X i0 and X
i
1, are for each type, be the levels of
date 0 and date 1 consumption bundles at some equilibrium: formally,
X i0 := {x ∈ RL|x¯i0 = x for some (x¯, λ¯, y¯, p¯, q¯) ∈ E}
and
X i1 := {x ∈ RL|x¯is = x for some (x¯, λ¯, y¯, p¯, q¯) ∈ E and some s = 1, . . . , S}.
By the properties of economy (e¯, u¯), all sets X i0 and X
i
1 are finite, and there are 
i > 0 such
that the open balls of radius 2i isolate these points from one another.24
5.3.2 Step 2: Perturbations of preferences
For each  > 0, ρ : RL → [0, 1] denotes a C∞ function such that ρ(δ) = 1 in B(0) and
ρ(δ) = 0 outside B2(0).
25 Also, (∆x¯)x¯∈Xi0 is an array of symmetric, L × L matrices with
norm less than δ > 0;26 this array contains one matrix for each of the equilibrium levels of
consumption of individuals of type i at date 0. For δ small enough, the function
ui0(x) = u¯
i
0(x) +
1
2
∑
x¯∈Xi0
ρi(x− x¯) · (x− x¯)T∆x¯(x− x¯)
satisfies all properties of utility functions (that is, it lies in the class U). Of course, the same
holds for date 1 preferences: for an array (∆x¯)x¯∈Xi1 , containing a symmetric matrix for each
date-1 equilibrium consumption, the associated admissible date 1 utility function is
ui1(x) = u¯
i
1(x) +
1
2
∑
x¯∈Xi1
ρi(x− x¯) · (x− x¯)T∆x¯(x− x¯).
As a result, there is, for each individual, a new ex-ante utility function ui(x) = ui0(x0) +∑S
s=1 pi
i
su
i
1(xs), which varies smoothly simply with the arrays of matrices ∆.
More formally, U¯δ is the set of all profiles of ex-ante utility functions that can be obtained by
perturbing the corresponding u¯i0 and u¯
i
1 functions as described; this set is a finite-dimensional
submanifold of U2I , parameterized by
Bδ :=
∏
i
(Bδ(0)
#Xi0 ×Bδ(0)#Xi1),
with each open ball taken in RL(L+1)/2. Importantly, if one restricts F to profiles of preferences
defined in U¯δ and adopts this parameterization, then F is twice continuously differentiable.
Also, for profiles in this set,
24 As before, B2i(x¯) ∩Xi0 = {x¯}, for each x¯ ∈ Xi0, and similarly for bundles in Xi1.
25 [12], or [6].
26 Formally, each matrix is a real vector with L(L+ 1)/2 components; their norms are computed by treating
them as vectors.
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1. for any bundle x, there exists at most one perturbation that is “active” in the sense that
there is at most one x¯ ∈ X i0 such that
ui0(x) = u¯
i
0(x) +
1
2
r · (x− x¯)T∆x¯(x− x¯),
for r > 0, and similarly, for ui1; and
2. at every the equilibrium of the economy (e¯, u¯) the perturbations affect only the Hessian
of the utility functions, and these are perturbed exactly by the corresponding matrix: for
each (x¯, λ¯, y¯, p¯, q¯) ∈ E ,
ui0(x¯
i
0) = u¯
i
0(x¯
i
0), Du
i
0(x¯
i
0) = Du¯
i
0(x¯
i
0) and D
2ui0(x¯
i
0) = D
2u¯i0(x¯
i
0) + ∆x¯i0 ,
and
ui1(x¯
i
s) = u¯
i
1(x¯
i
s), Du
i
1(x¯
i
s) = Du¯
i
1(x¯
i
s) and D
2ui1(x¯
i
s) = D
2u¯i1(x¯
i
s) + ∆x¯is
for every date-1 state s.
5.3.3 Invariance of equilibria
By the Implicit Function Theorem, equilibria are locally invariant.
Lemma 4 There exist δ˜ > 0 and ˜ > 0 such that, for every profile of preferences u in the set
U¯δ˜ and for every equilibrium (x¯, λ¯, y¯, p¯, q¯) in E,
F(x, λ, y, p, q, e¯, u) = 0 and (x, λ, y, p, q) ∈ B˜(x¯, λ¯, y¯, p¯, q¯)
for, (x, λ, y, p, q) = (x¯, λ¯, y¯, p¯, q¯) and only there.
The importance of this construction is the invariance of equilibria with respect to the per-
turbations of preferences.
Proposition 1 There exists δ > 0 such that for every profile of preferences u in U¯δ, the set
of competitive equilibria of economy (e¯, u) is exactly E.
Proof: Let  := min{¯, ˜} > 0. By continuity of F , there exists δ¯ > 0 such that, for every
∆ ∈ Bδ¯(0), F(x, λ, y, p, q, e¯,∆) = 0 implies that
(x, λ, y, p, q) ∈ ∪(x¯,λ¯,y¯,p¯,q¯)∈EB(x¯, λ¯, y¯, p¯, q¯).
If δ := min{δ¯, δ˜}, and if ∆ ∈ Bδ, then, by Lemma 4, the set of equilibria of economy (e¯,∆) is a
subset of E . The other inclusion is immediate. 2
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5.3.4 The local subspace of economies
Given any economy in Dr, the argument for denseness of the set of economies where all equi-
librium allocations are constrained inefficient will look for economies where this property holds
in the following “neighborhood” of the given economy.
Lemma 5 Given an economy, (e¯, u¯), and a profile of utility perturbations ∆ ∈ Bδ, there is a
system of equations
1. for every i and every s = 1, . . . , S,
1
λi0
piisDu¯
i
1(x
i
s) + pi
i
s(D
2u¯i1(x
i
s) + ∆
i
s)β
i
s − γispT1 + piisI˜Tµ = 0;
2. for every i and every s = 1, . . . , S, p1 · βis = 0;
3.
∑
i
∑S
s=1 λ
i
sI˜βis +
∑
i
∑S
s=1 γ
i
s(˜¯e
i
s − ˜¯xis) = 0; and
4. for every i,
∑S
s=1 γ
i
s + η = 0,
where µ ∈ R, η ∈ R, βis ∈ RL and γis ∈ R, such that, if (e¯, u¯) ∈ Dr and δ is chosen as in
Proposition 1, then there exists a subset of U¯δ of preferences that is
1. strongly generic (as subset of U¯δ), and
2. such that if (x, λ, y, p, q) is a competitive equilibrium of economy (e¯,∆), then the system
above has no solution.27
5.4 The proof of Theorem 3
The claim is that the set of economies where all equilibrium allocations are constrained inef-
ficient is dense. Since Dr is generic, it suffices to show that for each (e¯, u¯) ∈ Dr there is an
economy (e, u), arbitrarily close to (e¯, u¯), where the property holds. For this, the endowments
is fixed, e = e¯, and alternative preferences are in the lower-dimensional “neighborhood” of u¯
that is defined by Lemma 5. This neighborhood is N . Since N has full measure, as a subset of
the local subspace of economies constructed around (e¯, u¯), if, generically in N , all equilibrium
allocations of (e¯,∆) are constrained inefficient, then the Theorem follows.
Lemma 6 The function28
M(x, λ, y, p, q,∆, θ) :=
 F(x, λ, y, p, q, e¯,∆)Dx,λ,p,y,τH(x, λ, p, y, (−qyi)Ii=1, e¯,∆)Tθ
1
2
(θTθ − 1)
 .
27 The profile of matrices ∆ identifies the profile of ex-ante preferences constructed as in §5.3.2 above, given
(e¯, u¯) ∈ Dr.
28 It maps
RI(S+1)L++ × R(S+1)I++ × RI × P2 × R×N × RI+I(S+1)L+I(S+1)+2(L−1)+1+1
into
RI(S+1)L × RI(S+1) × RI × R2(L−1) × R× RI(S+1)L × RI(S+1) × R2(L−1) × R2I × R.
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is transverse to 0.
By the Transversality Theorem, Lemma 6 implies that for a generic subset of N , one has
that M(·,∆) t 0. Now, the matrix Dx,λ,y,p,q,θM has
I(S + 1)L+ I(S + 1) + I + 2(L− 1) + 1 + I(S + 1)L+ I(S + 1) + 2(L− 1) + 2I + 1
rows, and only
I(S + 1)L+ (S + 1)I + I + 2(L− 1) + 1 + I + I(S + 1)L+ I(S + 1) + 2(L− 1) + 1 + 1
columns, and, since I ≥ 2, it follows that it cannot have full row rank. Then, it must be that
on a strongly generic subset of N , the function M(·,∆) is never zero, which means that, in
that set, whenever F(x, λ, y, p, q, e¯,∆) = 0, it is also true that the matrix
Dx,λ,p,y,τH(x, λ, p, y, (qyi)Ii=1, e¯,∆)
has full row rank. It follows then from Lemma 1 that x is constrained inefficient, whenever
F(x, λ, y, p, q, e¯,∆) = 0.
6 Further examples
The mechanism by which a reallocation of assets can induce a Pareto improvement in Theorem
3 relies precisely on the two effects illustrated in the examples of Section 1. Recall that the
requirements for effectiveness of a policy intervention in those examples were the ability of the
policy to affect date-1 commodity relative prices, and that the aggregate of date-1 commodity
trades weighted by probabilities and marginal utilities of income did not vanish. In the proof of
Theorem 3, these two features remain critical. To see this, note the third and fourth properties
guaranteed to hold, generically on endowments, by Lemma 3. The third condition is precisely
the second feature illustrated by the examples, and allows us to prove Lemma 5, and, hence,
Lemma 6.29 The fourth condition allows the policy intervention to affect relative prices; it is
used in the proof of Lemma 6 directly.30
The two further examples given next illustrate how the general result extends to economies
with richer structures. The first example is similar to the case presented in subsection 1.2, but
introduces a more general production technology. The second example extends the argument
to an economy with overlapping generations. While we leave the general argument for these
structures as a subject for future research, it is important to note that the mechanism why a
policy can affect ex-ante utility levels in these two cases is exactly the same as in the general
result and the two examples above, which we remark at the end of this section.
29 See the proof of Claim 2 in the appendix.
30 See the proof of Claim 1 in the appendix.
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6.1 A production economy
As in the example presented in Subsection 1.2, a two-period economy is populated by a con-
tinuum of mass 1 of identical individuals. Again, a single commodity is available in the first
period, and it can be either consumed or invested: the amount of this commodity that is saved
by the individuals becomes their endowment for the second period; we denote this amount by
k. In the second period, this level k of capital is combined with a second production factor,
labor, to produce a consumption good; denote by l and c, respectively, the amounts of labor
used and of consumption good produced at date 1.
In the first period, individuals only consume and save. In the second period, they are
endowed with l¯ units of labor that they supply inelastically, together with their savings k, in
exchange for the consumption good. Initially, there is no risk, so that all the individuals are
endowed with l¯ at date 1. The over-all utility of the individuals is
u(k, c) = −k + v(c),
where v is the person’s utility index for consumption in the second period. If the consumption
good is nume`raire of the second period, and if the price of capital as 1+r and the price of labor
as w, then the date-1 budget of the individuals is
τ(k) = (1 + r)k + wl¯,
which they use to buy consumption, so c = τ(k).
The technology of production is
y = f(k, l) + (1− δ)k,
where function f is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale. It is immediate, then, from
the maximization of profits, that (1 + r) = fk + (1 − δ) and w = fl, while, as response to a
perturbation,31 dr = fkkdk and dw = flkdk = fkldk.
From the optimization of the individuals, it must be that λ(1 + r) = 1, where λ represents
the marginal utility of consumption at date 1. This implies that32
du = −dk + λ(kdr + l¯dw + (1 + r)dk) = kdr + l¯dw
1 + r
=
kfkk + l¯fkl
1 + r
dk,
which, since fk is homogeneous of degree 0, is du = 0. This equality that confirms that, under
certainty, the privately determined level of investment cannot be improved upon.
31 In these expressions and henceforth, it is simpler to omit the arguments, (k, l¯), of function f .
32 In this case, since there is only one commodity at date 1, the computation of λ is immediate. In the case
of multiple commodities, one would express the indirect utility of the individual as V (τ) = v(c(p, τ)) and use
λ = V ′. In general, also, with a consumption plan c, endowment e and prices p, one would have
du = −dk + λ(−cdp+ edp+ (1 + r)dk).
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Now, the endowment of labor in the second period is subject to idiosyncratic risk, and is
l¯s = l¯ + εs in personal state s, which occurs with probability pis. As before, E[εs] = 0, and
τs(k) = (1 + r)k + wl¯s
is the individuals’ nominal wealth in personal state s. With ex-ante preferences
u(k, c) = −k + E[vs(cs)],
if λs is the marginal utility of revenue in state s, the first-order condition of the individuals at
date 0 is that (1 + r)E[λs] = 1. As a consequence,
du = E[λs(kfkk + l¯sfkl)]dk = E[λsεs]fkldk = cov(λs, εs)fkldk, (8)
where cov(λs, εs) denotes the covariance of the two random variables. The equilibrium allocation
is thus constrained suboptimal, as long as cov(λs, εs) 6= 0. In particular, with state-independent,
strictly concave Bernoulli indices, the marginal utility of income is anti-comonotone with the
level of consumption, which implies that cov(λs, εs) < 0, provided that idiosyncratic risk is non-
degenerate; in this case, since fkl > 0, the expression above implies that individuals overinvest
at date 0: if dk < 0, then du > 0.33
Once again, for a closed-form solution, the Bernoulli index is
vs(cs) =
β
γ
cγs ,
where β > 0 and γ < 1. In this case, the marginal utilities of income are given by
λs = βc
γ−1
s = β(y + εsfl)
γ−1,
so the first-order condition of the individuals’ optimization problem is
1
1 + r
= βE[(y + εsfl)
γ−1]
while
du = βE[(y + εsfl)
γ−1εs]fkldk.
If further, there are two equally probable personal states, with εs = ±ε, then the first order
condition becomes
1
2
β(y + εfl)
γ−1 +
1
2
β(y − εfl)γ−1 = 1
1 + r
which implies, since ε > 0 and γ < 1, that
1
2
β(y − εfl)γ−1 > 1
1 + r
.
Since in this case, by substitution,
E[λsεs] =
1
2
β(y + εfl)
γ−1(ε) +
1
2
β(y − εfl)γ−1(−ε) = βε(1− (y − εfl)γ−1) < 0, (9)
which verifies that individuals overinvest at date 0.
33 For instance, in the case when there only are two equally probable personal states, with εs = ±ε, by
concavity it must be that λ(−ε) > λ(ε), so it follows immediately that Epi[λsεs] = ε(λ(ε)− λ(−ε))/2 < 0.
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6.2 Overlapping generations
Finally, the economy is one of overlapping generations, as in [9], where each generation lives
for two periods, and the population grows at a constant rate n ≥ 0. Suppose, also, that the
productive sector is as in the previous example.
Initially, individuals of the economy are endowed with l¯ units of labor in each of the two
periods they live, which they supply inelastically. Using the same notation as in the previous
example, their ex-ante utility is given by
u(k) = l¯w − k + v(l¯w + (1 + r)k),
and the effects of a perturbation are
du = l¯dw − dk + λ(kdr + l¯dw + (1 + r)dk).
In this case, the first-order conditions of individual optimization are that (1 + r)λ = 1, and, by
direct substitution,
du =
(2 + r)l¯dw + kdr
1 + r
.
On the other hand, since the total supply labor is (2 + n)l¯, we get, from the fact that the
production technology is of constant returns to scale, that
(2 + n)l¯dw + kdr = 0,
so
du =
r − n
1 + r
l¯flkdk,
which establishes the Golden Rule criterion: if the interest rate is above (resp. below) the rate
of population growth, in equilibrium the economy underinvests (resp. overinvests).
Alternatively, the endowment of labor in the second period is subject to idiosyncratic risk,
and is l¯s = l¯ + εs with probability pis, where E[εs] = 0. As before, if λs be the marginal utility
of income in state s, the first-order condition for optimization is that (1 + r)E[λs] = 1, and,
hence, the welfare effects of a perturbation are
du = l¯dw − dk + E[λs(kdr + l¯sdw + (1 + r)dk)] =
(
r − n
1 + r
l¯ + cov(λs, εs)
)
flkdk. (10)
With state-independent, strictly concave Bernoulli indices, cov(λs, εs) < 0, and it follows from
the latter expression that when the interest rate is below the rate of population growth the
competitive equilibrium implies overinvestment (as in the case of certainty). But now, in the
presence of idiosyncratic risk, the second prescription of the Golden Rule may fail, and in an
economy where the interest rate is higher than the growth of population, it may be that a
Pareto improvement requires for every generation to save less.
If the Bernoulli indices are state-independent and equal to
v(c) =
β
γ
cγ,
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as in the previous example, and
f(k, l) = kαl1−α,
then, from the first-order condition, we can solve for the optimal level of investment as
k = α
1
1−αγ [(2 + n)l¯]
(1−α)γ
1−αγ ∆
1
1−αγ ,
where ∆ = βE[(α + δs(1− α))γ−1] and
δs =
l¯ + εs
(2 + n)l¯
.
Also,
λs = βc
γ−1
s = β(y − (1 + n)l¯w + εsw)γ−1,
so if we further take that εs = ±ε with probability 1/2, then the first-order condition becomes
E[λs] =
1
2
β(y − (1 + n)l¯w + εw)γ−1 + 1
2
β(y − (1 + n)l¯w − εw)γ−1 = 1
1 + r
,
which implies that
1
2
β(y − (1 + n)l¯w − εw)γ−1 > 1
1 + r
.
By substitution,
E[λsεs] = ε
(
1
1 + r
− β(y − (1 + n)l¯w − εw)γ−1
)
< 0. (11)
Moreover, using the equilibrium value of k, in order to determine whether the presence of
idiosyncratic risk reverses the classical prescription of the golden rule, it suffices to compute we
can compute E[λsεs]. If the values of the different parameters are α = γ = 0.5, l¯ = 1.4, ε = 0.6
and β = 0.95. Table 1 gives the policy prescription, in terms of the sign a Pareto improving
perturbation dk, for different values of n.
With these values, if n ≤ 0.01, from the third column of the table, du/dk > 0, namely
that the economy underinvests at equilibrium – and for these values, since r > n, the Golden
Rule prescribes, similarly, that the economy should invest more. For values of n ≥ 0.06,
then du/dk < 0, so that the Pareto improvement should be induced by a reduction in capital
accumulation, which agrees with the recommendation of the Golden Rule, for in these cases
r < n. But the same is not true for values of 0.02 ≤ n ≤ 0.05, where the actual du/dk < 0
implies that the economy should accumulate less capital, while the Golden Rule prescribes the
opposite, since r > n.
6.3 The mechanism
The demonstration that these examples illustrate general results is left for future research.
Importantly, though, one must note that the mechanism behind the effectiveness of these policy
interventions is exactly the same as in the general argument of the paper – and in the two
examples given in the introduction.
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Table 1: Welfare effects of a policy perturbation
n r−n
1+r
l¯ r−n
1+r
l¯ + cov(λs, εs)
0 0.062004539 0.020834359
0.01 0.050169498 0.009184415
0.02 0.038357781 -0.002443666
0.03 0.026569236 -0.014050019
0.04 0.014803712 -0.02563478
0.05 0.003061059 -0.037198082
0.06 -0.008658872 -0.048740058
0.07 -0.020356227 -0.060260838
0.08 -0.03203115 -0.071760553
0.09 -0.043683786 -0.08323933
For the ex-ante homogeneous economy with general production, note from Eq. (8) that a
perturbation to the capital stock affects ex-ante utility if, and only if, fkl 6= 0 and cov(λs, εs) 6= 0.
The first requirement guarantees that the perturbation has effects on the date-1 wage, the
relevant relative price in this one-good economy. The second requirement is the condition
that the aggregate, across personal states, of commodity trades weighted by the product of the
probability and the marginal utility of revenue does not vanish. In the case of specific functional
forms, note from Eq. (9) that effectiveness of the policy requires that ε 6= 0, which is a generic
conditions endowments.34
The lesson in the case of the OLG economy is slightly different, for in this case the equilib-
rium allocation may fail Pareto efficiency even in the absence of uncertainty. Our point in this
case is that uncertainty introduces a new mechanism by which a policy perturbation can affect
ex-ante welfare, and that the standard recommendation derived from the Golden Rule may be
invalid. But, again, for this to be the case, two conditions have to be met: from Eq (10), it
requires that fkl 6= 0 and cov(λs, εs) 6= 0. These two requirements have the same interpretation
as before, and it follows from the computations for specific functions, in particular from Eq.
(11), that the result requires that ε 6= 0.
7 Concluding remarks
The positive properties of the standard general equilibrium model hold in an economy of ag-
gregate and uninsurable idiosyncratic risks. For every profile of endowments and preferences,
equilibria exist and, for profiles of preferences in a strongly generic set, the number of equilibria
is finite (Theorem 1).
Pareto efficiency requires marginal rates of substitution for commodities to be independent
34 It also requires that β 6= 0, for otherwise the individuals’ utilities are constant. This condition is, obviously,
generic on preferences.
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of the individual and of the idiosyncratic shocks; since these shocks are uninsurable, for any
profile of preferences, on a strongly generic set of endowments all competitive equilibrium
allocations are Pareto inefficient (Theorem 2).
But Pareto efficiency ignores the existence of financial constraints – in particular, the fact
that idiosyncratic risks may be uninsurable. A more interesting question is whether the existing
assets, which only allow for (perfect) insurance against aggregate shocks, can be used to in-
duce a Pareto improvement over the equilibrium allocations, without requiring that commodity
markets be closed. Following the definition of constrained suboptimality ([19], [10]), a simple
characterization of equilibria in which that type of social improvement is possible is given by
the technique of [6], which we apply here (Lemma 1).
Given a profile of preferences and a profile of endowments where there are finitely many equi-
libria and all of them are Pareto inefficient (a strongly generic condition), a finite-dimensional
space of preferences where the set of equilibria (for the fixed profile of endowments) does not
change is constructed (Proposition 1). This space is parameterized by perturbations to the
Hessians of the utility functions that do not change their gradients at the equilibrium points
(changes to the shape of individual demands that do not change their levels at equilibrium
prices). On this finite-dimensional space of preferences, a strongly generic subset has the prop-
erty that all equilibria are constrained inefficient; this implies that on an open and dense subset
of the space of economies, every competitive equilibrium allocation is constrained inefficient
(Theorem 3). The result requires that commodities be diverse enough (Lemma 2); this is
because the Pareto improvement is generated by the response of relative prices to the pertur-
bation in asset portfolios, which yields transfers of revenue across states of the world which
are not available directly from the existing assets: they create insurance opportunities against
idiosyncratic risk.
The general argument is motivated by two introductory examples, which illustrate the mech-
anism by which a financial policy can make all the individuals in the economy ex-ante better
off. It requires that the policy be able to perturb future relative prices, and it requires that in
the competitive equilibrium individuals fail to perfectly insure their idiosyncratic risk. Loosely
speaking, the first requirement is satisfied generically on preferences, while the second one holds
generically on endowments. In our general argument, these effects are crucial in the proof of the
main result in the paper,35 and, importantly, they constitute the mechanism by which the ideas
of the paper can be extended to economies with general production technologies (even if ex-ante
homogeneous) and to economies of overlapping generations, as illustrated by the examples of
the paper.
Our argument does not answer the question of what information is necessary for the deter-
mination of a Pareto improving financial intervention; it only says that one such intervention
typically exists. Existing results on the identification of unobservable fundamentals of the
economy, both positive and negative, do not apply to the structure of idiosyncratic risk, so
this question remains open. But our argument says that the view that intervention in financial
markets cannot induce a Pareto improvement is untenable; it is a different argument to say
35 They are captured by the third and fourth conditions in Lemma 3, which allow us to prove Lemmas 5 and
6; this last lemma is the main argument for Theorem 3.
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that productive intervention is impossible because of the inherent difficulty in determining the
right policy.
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Appendix: Proofs of the Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1: Since the partial Jacobean has full rank, it follows from the Inverse Func-
tion Theorem that H(·, e, u) maps a neighborhood of (x, λ, p, y, (qyi)Ii=1) onto a neighborhood of
H(x, λ, p, y, (qyi)Ii=1, e, u). It follows that for a small enough δ > 0, there exists (xˆ, λˆ, pˆ, yˆ, τˆ) such that
H(xˆ, λˆ, pˆ, yˆ, τˆ , e, u) = (u1(x1) + δ, . . . , uI(xI) + δ, 0, . . . , 0)T,
which means that x is constrained inefficient. 2
Proof of Lemma 2: Fix a profile of preferences u. Let pi := (pi11, . . . , pi
1
S , pi
2
1, . . . , pi
I
S)
T, and define the
function
(x, λ, y, p, q, e) 7→
( F(x, λ, y, p, q, e, u)∑
i
∑S
s=1
λis
λi0
(e˜is − x˜is)
)
,
for e in the generic subset of Theorem 2.
Suppose that (x, λ, y, p, q, e) 7→ 0. With arguments in the order
(x1, λ1, y1, . . . , xI , λI , yI , e1, . . . , eI),
its (partial) Jacobean writes as
D2u1(x1) −Ψ(p)T 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
−Ψ(p) 0 R(q) . . . 0 0 0 Ψ(p) . . . 0
0 R(q)T 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . D2uI(xi) −Ψ(p)T 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 . . . −Ψ(p) 0 R(q) 0 . . . Ψ(p)
0 0 0 . . . 0 R(q)T 0 0 . . . 0
Φ1 0 0 . . . ΦI 0 0 −Φ1 . . . −ΦI
0 0 1 . . . 0 0 1 0 . . . 0
L1 z1 0 . . . LI zI 0 −L1 . . . −LI

,
where, for each i,
Φi :=
(
I˜ 0 . . . 0
0 pii1I˜ . . . piiS I˜
)
and Li :=
(
λi1
λi0
I˜ . . . λ
i
S
λi0
I˜
)
,
where I˜ denotes the L-dimensional identity matrix, with its first row removed. We now argue that
this matrix has full row rank, in two steps.
Step 1: By standard arguments, the submatrix without the last superrow and the supercolumns
(e2, . . . , eI) has full row rank.
Step 2: When we add last superrow and the (e2, . . . , eI) supercolumns, we add (L − 1) rows and
(I − 1)(S + 1)L > L− 1 columns. Notice that, by Theorem 2, matrix(
pi21 pi
2
S
λ21 λ
2
S
)
has full rank. Fix any l = 2, . . . L. Multiply the columns e2l,1 and e
2
l,S , respectively, by α(e
2
l,1) and
α(e2l,S) such that (
pi21 pi
2
S
λ21 λ
2
S
)(
α(e2l,1)
α(e2l,S)
)
=
(
0
1
)
,
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and multiply the columns e21,1 and e
2
1,S , respectively, by −α(e2l,1)/pl and −α(e2l,S)/ pl. Leaving all other
columns unperturbed, this product gives 1 at the l-th entry of the last superrow and 0 everywhere
else. Doing this for all l = 2, . . . , L gives that the whole matrix has full row rank.
The latter implies that the mapping is transverse to 0 and, hence, that the set of endowments on
which it is transverse to 0, as a function of (x, λ, y, p, q) only, has full measure. Since the mapping has
I(S+ 1)L+ I(S+ 1) + I + 2(L− 1) +L components and (x, λ, y, p, q) contains only I(S+ 1)L+ I(S+
1) + I + 2(L− 1) + 1 arguments, and since L ≥ 2, it follows that this mapping can be transverse to 0
only if it never takes the value 0. 2
Proof of Lemma 3: Theorems 1 and 2 and Lemma 2 give strongly generic sets of endowments where
equilibria are finite and satisfy, respectively, the first three properties. For the fourth property, as in
Theorem 1, it suffices to observe that G(·, u) t 0, and then to invoke the Transversality Theorem, to
conclude that, for any profile of preferences u, in a strongly generic set of endowments, G(·, e, u) t 0.
With this result, genericity of the Dr follows by taking the intersection of these four generic sets. 2
Proof of Lemma 4: This follows immediately from the first property of Lemma 3, by the Implicit
Function Theorem. 2
Proof of Lemma 5: Consider the function
F(x, λ, y, p, q, e¯,∆)
...
1
λi0
piisDu¯
i
1(x
i
s) + pi
i
s(D
2u¯i1(x
i
s) + ∆
i
s)β
i
s − γispT1 + piisI˜Tµ
p1 · βis
...∑
i
∑S
s=1 λ
i
sI˜βis +
∑
i
∑S
s=1 γ
i
s(˜¯e
i
s − ˜¯xis)
...∑S
s=1 γ
i
s + η
...

.
We are going to show that this matrix is transverse to 0. For this, we first establish that when the
function takes value 0, βis 6= 0 for every i and every s = 1, . . . , S. To see that this is the case, suppose,
for instance, that β11 = 0. Then, it is immediate that
1
λ10
pi11Du¯
1
1(x
1
1) + pi
1
1 I˜Tµ = 0,
and hence, since pi11Du¯
1
1(x
1
1) = λ
1
1p1 and p1,1 = 1, and since the first column of I˜ is null, we have that
λ11/λ
1
0 = γ
1
1 and, hence, that µ = 0. Now, the latter implies that for every i and s,
1
λi0
piisDu¯
i
1(x
i
s) + pi
i
s(D
2u¯i1(x
i
s) + ∆
i
s)β
i
s − γispT1 = 0,
so, pre-multiplying by βis, and since, by construction, pi
i
sDu¯
i
1(x
i
s) = λ
i
sp1 and p1 · βis = 0, we have that
piis(β
i
s)
T(D2u¯i1(x
i
s) + ∆
i
s)β
i
s = 0,
which implies that βis = 0, and then that λ
i
s/λ
i
0 = γ
i
s for all i and s. Now, by condition (3), the latter
implies that
∑
i
∑S
s=1(λ
i
s/λ
i
0)(˜¯e
i
s − x˜is) = 0, while F(x, λ, y, p, q, e¯,∆) = 0, which contradicts the fact
that ∆ ∈ Bδ, by the third condition of Lemma 3.
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Now, we need to show that the Jacobean of the function has full row rank when the function takes
value of 0. Since, in this case, by construction and Proposition 1, D∆F(·) = 0, it suffices to show that
the Jacobean of the rest of the components of the function (i.e., excluding the first component, F)
give a full-row-rank Jacobean with respect to (β, γ, µ, η,∆). With the arguments in the order
(β11 , γ
1
1 , . . . , β
I
S , γ
I
S ,∆
1
1, . . . ,∆
I
S),
the Jacobean writes as
pi11(D
2u¯11(x
1
1) + ∆
1
1) −pT1 . . . 0 0 N(β11) . . . 0
−p1 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . piIS(D
2u¯I1(x
I
S)∆
I
S) −pT1 0 . . . N(βIS)
0 0 . . . −p1 0 0 . . . 0
λ11I˜ ˜¯e
1
1 − x¯11 . . . λIS I˜ ˜¯eIS − x¯IS 0 . . . 0
0 1T . . . 0 1T 0 . . . 0

,
where for t ∈ RL, N(t) denotes the L× L(L+ 1)/2 matrix
t1 t2 t3 . . . tL 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
0 t1 t2 . . . 0 t2 t3 . . . tL . . . 0
0 0 t1 . . . 0 0 t2 . . . 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . t1 0 0 . . . t2 . . . tL
 ,
which has full row rank if (and only if) t 6= 0. We argue that the Jacobean has full row rank in a
series of steps.
Step 1: The submatrix consisting of the first 2(IS) superrows and supercolumns is invertible, by a
standard arguments; when we add the other supercolums and superrows, we add more columns than
rows, so it suffices to show that we can perturb the added superrows without perturbing the initial
ones, which we do in the following steps.
Step 2: Fix l = 2, . . . , L, and define the vector α as follows: α(βi1,l) = 1/λ
1
1, α(β
1
1,1) = −p1,l/λ11, and
α(χ) = 0 for every other argument except for ∆11, for which we fix α(∆
1
1) such that
N(β11)α(∆
1
1) = −pi11(D2U¯11 (x11) + ∆11)α(β11),
which we can do since N(β11) contains an invertible L × L submatrix, given that β11 6= 0. Then, the
postmultiplication of the Jacobean by α gives 0 in every component, except in the one corresponding
to the l-th commodity in the term
∑
i
S∑
s=1
λisI˜βis +
∑
i
S∑
s=1
γis(˜¯e
i
s − ˜¯xis),
where it gives 1.
Step 3: Fix i = 1, . . . , I, and define the vector α as follows: α(γi1) = 1, for all l = 2, . . . , L α(β
i
1,l) =
−(e¯i1,l − xi1,l)/λil, while α(βi1,1) =
∑L
l=2 p1,l(e¯
i
1,l − xi1,l)/λil, and α(χ) = 0 for every other argument,
except for ∆i1, where α(∆
i
1) is fixed so that
N(βi1)α(∆
i
1) = −pii1(D2U¯ i1(xi1) + ∆i1)α(βi1),
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which we can do since N(βi1) contains an invertible L×L submatrix, given that βi1 6= 0. As before, the
postmultiplication of the Jacobean by α gives 0 in every component, except in the one corresponding
to the term
∑S
s=1 γ
i
s + η, where it gives 1.
It follows that the function is transverse to 0, and, hence, that for ∆ fixed on subset of U¯δ with full
Lebesgue measure (relative to U¯δ itself), the function is transverse to 0 in the rest of the arguments.
But, as in other arguments, this function has more components than arguments: fixing ∆, it has only
I(S + 1)L+ I(S + 1) + I + 2(L− 1) + 1 + ISL+ IS + (L− 1) + 1
arguments, and consists of
I(S + 1)L+ I(S + 1) + I + 2(L− 1) + 1 + ISL+ IS + (L− 1) + I
equations. It follows, then, that the only way in which the function can be transverse to 0, for fixed
∆, is for it to never take the value 0, which proves the result. 2
Proof of Lemma 6: Suppose that M(x, λ, y, p, q,∆, θ) = 0. By Proposition 1, it must be that
F(x, λ, y, p, q, e¯, u¯) = 0, so, by construction,
ui0(x
i
0) = u¯
i
0(x
i
0), Du
i
0(x
i
0) = Du¯
i
0(x
i
0) and D
2ui0(x
i
0) = D
2u¯i0(x
i
0) + ∆
i
0,
and
ui1(x
i
s) = u¯
i
1(x
i
s), Du
i
1(x
i
s) = Du¯
i
1(x
i
s) and D
2ui1(x
i
s) = D
2u¯i1(x
i
s) + ∆
i
s
for every i and s.36
Let us name the rows of DH by37
(u1, . . . , uI, f1, b1, . . . , fI, bI, c0, c1, a, t),
so that we can denote θ by
θT := (θu1, . . . , θuI , θTf1, θ
T
b1, . . . , θ
T
fI , θ
T
bI , θ
T
c0, θ
T
c1, θa, θt),
where θui ∈ R, θfi ∈ R(S+1)L, θbi ∈ RS+1, θc0 ∈ RL−1 θc1 ∈ RL−1, θt ∈ R and θa ∈ R. For these
vectors, we will further denote by a superindex the state and/or the commodity they correspond to,
if applicable (for instance, θsfi ∈ RL and θs,lfi ∈ R).
System Dx,λ,p,y,τH(x, λ, p, y, (qyi)Ii=1, e¯,∆)Tθ = 0 can be rewritten as follows:
1. for each i,
θuiDu¯
i
0(x
i
0)
T + (D2u¯i0(x
i
0) + ∆
i
0)θ
0
fi − θ0bipT0 + I˜θc0 = 0,
and
θuipi
i
sDu¯
i
1(x
i
s)
T + piis(D
2u¯i1(x
i
s) + ∆
i
s)θ
s
fi − θsbipT1 + piisI˜Tθc1 = 0
for every s = 1, . . . , S;
2. for each i, p0θ0fi = 0 and p1θ
s
fi = 0 for for every s = 1, . . . , S;
36 Here, for simplicity, we are adopting the notation ∆is for ∆
i
xis
. Also, in what follows we will only consider
utility perturbations that are “active” at the given equilibrium, so we take the profile ∆ as simply ((∆is)
S
s=0)
I
i=1.
37 The logic for this choice is the following: the components of vector θ are identified with the equations of
function H; then, ui refers to the utility level of type-i individuals, fi and bi to their first-order and budget-
balance conditions, c0 and c1 to commodity market clearing in both dates, and a and t to the balance required
for asset allocations and revenue transfers.
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3. at date 0, ∑
i
λi0I˜θ0fi +
∑
i
θ0bi(˜¯e
i
0 − x˜i0) = 0,
while ∑
i
S∑
s=1
λisI˜θsfi +
∑
i
S∑
s=1
θsbi(˜¯e
i
s − x˜is) = 0
at date 1; and
4. for every i, θ0bi + θt = 0 and
∑S
s=1 θ
s
bi + θa = 0.
We establish three key properties of this system, by the following claims:
Claim 1 For at least one type of individuals i, we have that θui 6= 0.
Proof: Suppose, by way of contradiction, that θui = 0 for every type. By substituting in condition (1)
of the system, this would imply that
Dx,λ,p,y,τG(x, λ, p, y, (qyi)Ii=1, e¯,∆)Tθ˜ = 0,
for
θ˜ := (θTf1, θ
T
b1, . . . , θ
T
fI , θ
T
bI , θ
T
c0, θ
T
c1, θa, θt)
T.
Since G(x, λ, p, y, (qyi)Ii=1, e¯,∆) = 0 and (e¯,∆) ∈ Dr, it follows from the fourth property of Lemma 3
that θ˜ = 0 and hence that θ = 0, which contradicts the fact that θTθ − 1 = 0. 2
Claim 2 For every type i and date-1 state s = 1, . . . , S, we have that θsfi 6= 0.
Proof: The argument is the same as in the proof that every βis 6= 0 in Lemma 5, invoking Lemma 2,
so details are omitted. 2
Claim 3 For every type i, we have that θ0fi 6= 0.
Proof: As in the proof of Claim 2, if θ0fi = 0 for some i, then θc0 = 0 and θ
0
fj = 0 for every j = 1, . . . , I.
This implies, by condition (1), that θuiλi0 = θ
0
bi, and then, by condition (4), that θuiλ
i
0 = −θt for all
i and s = 1, . . . , S. By Claim 1, it must be that θt 6= 0, so we can define µ = −θ−1t θc1, η = −θ−1t θa,
βis = −θ−1t θsfi and γis = −θ−1t θsbi. By construction, since θt 6= 0, vector (β, γ, µ, η) solves the system
defined in Lemma 5, which is impossible. 2
Now, to see that M t 0, notice that DM(x, λ, y, p, q,∆, θ) writes as Dx,λ,y,p,qF(x, λ, y, p, q, e¯,∆) 0 0M N(θ) Dx,λ,p,y,τH(x, λ, p, y, (qyi)Ii=1, e¯,∆)T
0 0 θT
 ,
where
N(θ) :=

N(θ0f1) 0 . . . 0
0 N(θ1f1) . . . 0
...
...
. . . . . .
0 0 . . . N(θSfI)

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for N(t) defined as in the proof of Lemma 5. Since Dx,λ,y,p,qF(x, λ, y, p, q, e¯,∆) has full rank, because
(e¯,∆) ∈ Dr, it suffices that matrix(
N(θ) Dx,λ,p,y,τH(x, λ, p, y, (qyi)Ii=1, e¯,∆)T
0 θT
)
have full row rank for DM(x, λ, y, p, q,∆, θ) to have full row rank. By Claims 2 and 3, it follows that
N(θsfi) has full row rank for all type i and all state, present and future, s = 0, . . . , S. An argument
similar to the one given in Lemma 5 for transversality of the mapping defined there shows that this
matrix has full row rank, and, hence, that matrix DM(x, λ, y, p, q,∆, θ) has full row rank. 2
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